



Darfur: Genocide in Slow Motion

By Richard S. Williamson

We live in momentous times when the war on terror, the advance of freedom, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and sorting out post-Cold War relationships are only some of the challenges that consume us. History will judge these days on what we do and what we do not do; what we accomplish and what we let languish. Even if we do much, achieve a great deal, but turn our backs on the great moral challenges of our time, history will not be kind to us nor should it be.

Today, the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world is in Darfur, Sudan. It is manmade. It is horrific. And it must end.

The international community has the capacity to stop this carnage. Yet it has not done so.

In the days after World War II, as the world became fully aware of the Nazis' systematic extermination of the Jews, the civilized world recoiled in horror and shame. Leaders said, "Never again."

Among the measures taken in response to these atrocities were the Nuremberg trials to hold accountable those guilty of the greatest responsibility for the Nazi crimes against humanity. Another step was the creation of the United Nations to help "prevent the scourge of war" and protect the dignity of man. Also, the international community adopted the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Respect for and protection of individual rights, among other things, stand as a deterrent to such premeditated slaughter.

Tragically, the rhetoric of "never again" has not been matched by the resolve to stop other mass exterminations.¹ Genocide took place in the "Killing Fields" of Cambodia and the bloody slayings by machete in Rwanda.² Then came gruesome ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. The international community time after time said "never again," and now we have the decimation in Darfur, Sudan. Some have referred to the ghastly killings in Darfur as "Rwanda in slow motion."

This time no one can say that the atrocities are not known. No one can claim innocence. For the pain, suffering and death of innocent people in Darfur is well known. And the inadequacy of the response to this evil is widely recognized.

Brief History of the Conflict

Sudan is a large, diverse and war-torn country. About the size of France, it has the largest landmass of any African nation and sits on the ancient crossroads between Arab North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Sudan's geographic diversity includes desert, jungle, plains and mountains. For countless generations, the Arabs of the north and the blacks of the south lived in peace, intermingling and intermarrying. Historically, Sudan was a mosaic of different tribes with various languages and many religions. More than 150 native languages are spoken in Sudan today, including some 20 in the Darfur region. Martin Meredith, in his important book, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair*, writes that in Sudan, the British, "used tribal identities to divide their subjects" as a means to keep control of this vast country.³ The British restricted education in Darfur to the sons of chiefs. In 1935, there was only one elementary school in all of Darfur.⁴

As the British prepared to leave, they began to hand control over to the northern Muslims. In 1954, they gave all but six of Sudan's 800 senior civil service posts to northerners.⁵ This engendered concern and resentment. In August 1955, the Southern Corps of the army mutinied and Khartoum authorities sent 8,000 troops from the north to try to establish order. Leading up to independence, the north offered to consider southern Sudan's demand for semi-autonomy under a federal constitution. However, once the British left in 1956, the north dismissed southern concerns. Then in 1958, when the army took control of the government, General Ibrahim Abboud sought to impose Islam and Arabic in the south. General Abboud "considered Christianity an alien religion...expressed contempt for African religions (and) disparaged indigenous languages and customs."⁶ He began building Muslim religious schools and mosques in the south and soon, civil war broke out. The conflict continued as Khartoum tried to repress the south and establish an Islamic republic.

Finally, the government negotiated a peace agreement with the Southern Liberation Movement in 1972. It provided a measure of local autonomy for the south. The constitution adopted a year later declared Sudan a secular state with freedom of religion for Christians, Jews and traditional African religions. Some 500,000 people died in that first civil war. Deep divisions lingered but peace lasted for 11 years.

During this period, friction between the Muslim north and the non-Muslim south continued. Khartoum controlled economic planning in the south and provided limited funds for development there. Khartoum interfered in southern politics and tension grew further after oil deposits were discovered in southern Sudan in 1978. The south unsuccessfully sought a refinery close to the oilfields but Khartoum ignored the request and instead planned a refinery in the north as well as a pipeline to the Red Sea.

Then in 1983, in Khartoum, the head of state, Gaafar Numeiri, declared an "Islamic revolution." He decreed that Sudan would be an Islamic republic governed by traditional Islamic law. Numeiri dissolved the southern regional government and divided the south into three regions. Thousands were arrested. Sudan again descended into civil war. Thousands of southern troops deserted and formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) headed by Colonel John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka officer. This civil war lasted 21 years, claimed the lives of 2 million

people and displaced 4 million people.⁷ Throughout this period, Khartoum was stretched thin to deal with the rebellion in the south.

Khartoum's focus on fighting the southern rebellion, the government's limited resources, persistent divisions between Arab and non-Arab, and great poverty were the dry kindling that ignited the awful conflagration of destruction in Darfur.

A large region in western Sudan, Darfur has scarce natural resources and historically has suffered from economic discrimination and neglect.⁸ Long an autonomous sultanate, Darfur was conquered by the British in 1916 and merged with Sudan. Professor Gerard Prunier, in his book *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, traces to British colonial rule policies to keep Darfur backward.⁹ They have continued. Khartoum ignored Darfur's infrastructure, rarely paying for road repair, schools or hospitals.

Over time, the deprivation in Darfur has led to fights over land and water between the agriculturalists and nomadic tribes. In the 1980s, draught and desertification drove the Arab nomadic pastoralists further south into areas of black agriculturalists. There were occasional violent clashes with Khartoum supporting the nomads. In 1985, during a period of famine, Khartoum had Libyan forces deliver food aid in Darfur.¹⁰ The Libyans distributed the aid largely through nomadic tribes they identified as Arabs and armed them. In 1994, Sudan President Omar El Bashir reorganized the administration in Darfur giving members of Arab ethnic groups new positions of power. This accelerated the polarization in Darfur between Arab and non-Arab, which before had been splintered between dozens of tribes, languages and customs. Resentment grew among the "African" agriculturalists toward the Khartoum-backed "Arabs."¹¹ Also, during this period, the civil war in neighboring Chad spilled over in Darfur and "led some Arab tribes to adopt a supremacist ideology."¹²

In 2003, while Khartoum still was consumed with fighting the rebellion in the south, two insurgences from the "African" agriculturalists engaged in a series of raids and skirmishes killing several hundred government troops.¹³ Awful as these casualties were, this small rebel movement posed no serious threat to Khartoum's rule. However, reluctant to divert soldiers from the south, Khartoum opened the gates of hell.

Professor Benjamin Valentino in his book, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century*, concludes that "(m)ass killing normally is driven by instrumental, strategic calculations. Perpetrators see mass killing as a means to an end, not an end in itself."¹⁴

Rather than reply with a targeted response directed at a few men of the incipient rebellion, Khartoum further armed the militia in Darfur.¹⁵ More than 20,000 highwaymen and bandits were armed, drawn from impoverished nomadic Arab groups in Darfur and Chad. These militia, known as the Janjaweed, were unleashed to wage a systematic campaign of mayhem and destruction against African civilians in the area belonging to the same non-Arab ethnic groups as the rebels: the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa. One commentator has written that "(t)he Sudanese government's tactic seems to have been straight from the Maoist theory book. By destroying African villages, the army and their Arab militia allies drained the sea the rebels swim in."¹⁶

Often the attacks begin with government aerial bombardment of civilians—mainly using Antonov supply planes dropping lethal barrel bombs filled with metal shards, sometimes using helicopter gunships or MIG jet fighters.¹⁷ After the aerial attacks, Janjaweed riding camels and on horseback sweep into villages. They burn huts, destroy crops, slaughter or steal livestock, rape and brand women as slaves. African males, infant, men and elderly, are sometimes butchered as well. And non-Arab Sudanese are systematically expelled from their homes.

The overwhelming majority of the men, women and children victimized by these merciless atrocities have no relation whatsoever to the insurgents. Their crime is their ethnicity. They are non-Arab and they are defenseless.

Terrible crimes have been committed. Innocent people have suffered and many continue to perish. The ethnic cleansing has risen to horrific levels.

The ethnic pattern of these atrocities is clear. A United Nations observer team reported that non-Arab black villages were attacked while Arab villages were untouched.¹⁸

The 23 Fur villages in the Shattaya Administrative Unite have been completely depopulated, looted and burned to the ground (the team observed several such sites driving through the area for two days). Meanwhile, dotted alongside these charred locations are unharmed, populated and functioning Arab settlements. In some locations, the distance between a destroyed Fur village and an Arab village is less than 500 meters.

Following 25 days on the ground documenting the situation, Human Rights Watch reported, “Since August 2003, wide swaths of (Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa) homelands, among the most fertile in the region, have been burned and depopulated. With rare exceptions, the countryside is now emptied of its original Masalit and Fur inhabitants. Everything that can sustain and succor life—livestock, food stores, wells and pumps, blankets and clothing—has been looted or destroyed. Villages have been torched not randomly, but systematically—often not once, but twice.”¹⁹

Two years ago, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned of “ethnic cleansing” in Darfur and called on the international community to act. Eighteen months ago, then Secretary of State Colin Powell labeled the ongoing atrocities in Darfur “genocide.”²⁰ Meanwhile, the violent atrocities continued and the world’s response has been modest.

Paul Rosesabagina faced the forces of evil during the genocide in Rwanda and emerged a hero. The film “Hotel Rwanda” was based on his story as a hotel manager in Kigali who saved Tutsis in the midst of the killings by offering them refuge. Not long ago he wrote:

History shows us that genocides can happen only if four important conditions are in place. There must be the cover of a war. Ethnic grievances must be manipulated and exaggerated. Ordinary citizens must be deputized by their government to become executioners. And the rest of the world must be persuaded to look away and do nothing. The last is the most shameful of all, especially so because genocide is happening again right now in Darfur and the world community has done precious little to stop the killings.²¹

Testimonials of Horror

A numbing number of people have died in Darfur, with estimates ranging up to 400,000. More than 2 million Africans have been driven from their homes. Most now live in desperate conditions in refugee camps in southern Sudan and neighboring Chad.²² Even while living in these perilous conditions, the black Africans from Darfur are not safe. In addition to malnutrition and disease, a number of refugee camps have been attacked by the Janjaweed.²³ The nightmare is not over. More important, the sheer numbers do not tell the real story. Numbers never do. The stories of the Sudanese army and Janjaweed atrocities are horrific. No mercy has been given. Their ferocious attacks on innocent Africans have left a trail of destruction, death and misery.

As a consequence of the good work and diligence of journalists, United Nations officials, and human rights and humanitarian workers, the destruction in Darfur has been documented and many of the disturbing stories of horror have been recorded. Nicholas Kristof of *The New York Times* has provided particularly exhaustive and noteworthy coverage on the tragic events in the region.²⁴ It is through the voice of the victims that one can gain some appreciation for the unremitting brutality inflicted upon Darfur.

One 27-year old woman from Amnaty village reported to Amnesty International about the attacks.

“They dropped bombs from Antonovs on our cattle and on our huts. We were hiding near the village and were going back to the village at night to sleep there... Then they attacked the village. It was in the morning. I was preparing breakfast when I saw them coming. They started shooting. They came with horses and cars and they were all in uniforms. They killed my husband Musa Harum Arba. I ran and left the village. I took my three children and two children of my neighbor and we ran to Hara, the village in the valley. Then we went to Abu Liha where we stayed for two days and from there to Bamina. The Janjaweed found us on the way. Antonovs bombarded us and killed three people. We were many on the run and some people were caught by Janjaweed. Nine girls and two boys were taken by Janjaweed. They took one of my uncles and his son, Khidder Ibrahim. We do not know what happened to these people.”²⁵

Amina Abakar Mohammed from Furawiyah told her story to award-winning journalist Samantha Power.

One day “(n)ot long after dawn, when Amina and Mohammed (her 10 year old son) arrived at the wells, they heard the sound of approaching planes. Fifteen minutes later, Amina recalled, the aircraft began bombing... When Amina saw the janjaweed approaching, she hurried the donkeys to a red-rock hillock three hundred yards away. She assumed that Mohammed had fled in another direction, but she turned and saw that he had remained at the wells, with the older boys and the men, in an effort to protect the animals. He and the others were surrounded by

several hundred janjaweed. As the circle closed around her son, she ducked behind the hillock and prayed.

By nightfall, the sounds of gunfire and screaming had faded, and Amina furtively returned to the wells. She discovered that they were stuffed with corpses, many of which had been dismembered. She was determined to find her son, but also hoped that she wouldn't. Rummaging frantically around the wells by the moonlight, she saw the bodies of dozens of people she knew, but for a long time she was unable to find her firstborn. Suddenly, she spotted his face—but only his face. Mohammed had been beheaded.²⁶

Several months later, Ms. Power visited Furawiyah and went to the wells in which the Janjaweed had stuffed the bodies of their victims. Now there only was desert. The Janjaweed had covered the evidence of their crimes and, in the process, taken away wells that had nourished the people for generations.

Following a visit to the area, Julie Flint, an independent journalist, testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

On a hillside in Chad, where a three-month-old refugee baby had just died for reasons that will never be known, I met a 12-year-old survivor of Tullus—a boy called Hussein Dafa'allah. He ran from Tullus with his mother and hid behind a tree with three other children. The youngest of the three, a girl from Fatima, was only seven years old. Hussein said a group of uniformed men approached him as he hid and sat down beside him. These men were not behaving as if they feared attack. Their behavior surely suggests there were no rebels here, nothing that could be considered a military target. The men taunted Hussein, calling him a 'Tora Bora'—a rebel, in Darfur-speak. Hussein told me: 'There are no Tora Bora in Tullus. It's a village.'

One of the men who cornered Hussein was apparently unarmed—a detail that suggests he was not a member of the Janjaweed. He ordered his companions to fire at the children behind the trees and Hussein was hit three times—in the face, a leg and an arm. The three other children were also hit, but no one could tell me what because of them. When Hussein's father arrived after the attackers left, he strapped his son onto a donkey and took him across Dar Masalit—the Masalit 'homeland'—to Chad.²⁷

In Terchana, 205 Africans were killed in one day by Janjaweed accompanied by three carloads of soldiers. A 42-year-old from that village, Adam, reported that the dead included 23 women and a 100-year-old man, Barra Younis. "Barra Younis couldn't walk and the Janjaweed burned him alive in his hut. They saw him there and they burned him." They took the cattle and burned the entire village. They took some food for the horses and burned the rest.²⁸

A 15-year-old boy from Goz Um Beta has shared his story of abduction and torture:

I was looking after the goats when I was taken by the Janjaweed... Eight other children who were not from my village were also taken, they are still with them, and myself I was able to escape. They took me to a camp in Abu Jidad where there were also many soldiers. They asked me where the goats were and beat me if I wasn't answering. They tied up my sexual organ with a rope and pulled from both sides each time they were asking the questions. They beat me several times a day. ...The other children received the same treatment from the Janjaweed and the soldiers.²⁹

Another typical case of torture was reported from the Garsila area. "A Fur man was detained and whipped until all the skin was flayed from his back. The whip handle was then used to gouge holes in his flesh."³⁰

And sexual violence is a common crime that accompanies Janjaweed attacks.³¹ "In the villages of Dingo and Koroma in Dar Masalit, for example, men have reported that the Janjaweed 'took girls into the grass and raped them there.' One of the girls raped was only thirteen-years-old. Near Sissi, three women, aged thirty-two, twenty-two and twenty-five, were abducted at a water hole and taken to Nouri School, which was abandoned, and were raped. In the village of Dureysa, on the Masalit-Fur border, a seventeen-year-old girl who resisted rape was killed and her naked body left on the street."³²

A 37-year-old from Mukjar told Amnesty International how the Janjaweed had raped and humiliated women.

When we tried to escape they shot more children. They raped women; I saw many cases of Janjaweed raping women and girls. They are happy when they rape. They sing when they rape and they tell us that we are just slaves and that they can do with us how they wish.³³

A woman from Silaya who was five months pregnant when she was abducted by the Janjaweed with eight other women shared this story.

After six days, some of the girls were released. But the others, as young as eight years old were kept there. Five to six men would rape us in rounds, one after the other for hours during six days, every night. My husband could not forgive me after this, he disowned me.³⁴

And many of the sad stories testify to the strong ethnic and racial component in the horrors of Darfur. A female refugee from Disa was interviewed in Goz Amer camp for Sudanese refugees in Chad and shared her story.

I was sleeping when the attack on Disa started. I was taken away by the attackers. They were all in uniforms. They took dozens of other girls and made us walk for three hours. During the day we were beaten and they were telling us, "You, the black women, we exterminate you, you have no god." At night we were raped several times. The Arabs guarded us with arms and we were not given food for three days.

A group of Masalit women in Goz Amer refugee camp reported their Janjaweed attackers cried out, “You blacks, you have spoiled the country! We are here to burn you. We will kill your husbands and sons and we will sleep with you!”³⁵

A Mesalit chief from the village of Disa reported that during the attack on his village the Janjaweed said:

You are Blacks, no Blacks can stay here, and no Black can stay in Sudan... The blood of the Blacks runs like water, we take their goods and we chase them from our area and our cattle will be in their land. The power of al-Bashir (president of Sudan) belongs to the Arabs and we will kill you until the end, you Blacks, we have killed your God.³⁶

And here are the words of a Janjaweed fighter according to a refugee from Kenya.

Omar al Bashir told us that we should kill all the Nabas. There is no place here for the Negroes anymore.³⁷

The testimonies make gruesome reading. And they echo thousands of other stories that have been collected from Darfur. They speak of summarily or indiscriminately killed Africans. They speak of raped, tortured, abducted and forcibly displaced Africans. They give account to how girls and women have been the particular target of sexual crimes. And most of these stories were collected more than two years ago. The killings, the atrocities have been known. They continue. Yet the international community has done little to react. Why?

The International Community’s Response

The problems in Darfur began in February 2003.³⁸ As the killing of innocent civilians picked up momentum, Khartoum had some discussions with the rebel groups but the peace talks collapsed on December 17, 2003. On January 13, 2004, the United Nations World Food Program appealed for \$11 million to help the Darfur refugees near the Chad border. On February 17, the UN announced an emergency airlift for 110,000 refugees fleeing the Janjaweed. By March 2004, the UN’s humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila said, “The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is the numbers involved of dead, tortured, and raped...This is ethnic cleansing, this is the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis, and I don’t know why the world is not doing more about it.”³⁹ On April 2, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland said that in Darfur, “scorched-earth tactics” have triggered “one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.” In a statement on April 7, 2004, US President George W. Bush condemned the “atrocities” in Darfur, stating that, “The government of Sudan must not remain complicit in the brutalization of Darfur.”⁴⁰

Also, in early April 2004, on the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan traveled to Geneva to address the UN Commission on Human Rights.⁴¹ I was there serving as the US Ambassador to the Commission. At the time, negotiations for a resolution on the situation in Darfur seemed dead in the water. Annan talked about the

tragic events in Rwanda 10 years earlier when, in 100 horrific days, Hutus had slaughtered 800,000 Tutsis, mostly by hand, neighbor wielding machetes against neighbor.⁴² Annan outlined his thoughts about how the international community, and in particular the UN, might act to avoid a repeat of the terrible slaughter in Rwanda. Then he turned to the gruesome events in Darfur. He called the killings “ethnic cleansing.” He demanded “swift and decisive action” from the international community. He even raised the possibility of “military action.”

As the first sub-Saharan African ever to serve as UN Secretary-General, Annan’s words had a powerful impact on all the delegates, especially those from Africa. There was new momentum within the commission to address the situation in Darfur. On behalf of the US, I pushed for a resolution that would call on the Sudanese government to stop arming those engaged in these terrible acts and stop all other support given to the Janjaweed. I sought a strong and effective mechanism to monitor and report on the events in Darfur. And I sought a guarantee for unfettered access for humanitarian assistance to the displaced people that already numbered some 900,000.⁴³ From Washington, instructions for demarches seeking support for this resolute position went out to capitals all over the world. For a time, there seemed to be reason to hope we would be successful. Unfortunately, we were not.

While following Annan’s speech, most African delegations recognized the need to address the situation in Darfur, regional loyalties made many African states susceptible to Khartoum’s enticements for a watered-down resolution. Then, in negotiations between the Africans and the European Union, the EU proved more interested in sub-Saharan buy-in to any resolution and the broadest possible consensus than in the people suffering in Darfur. When Irish Ambassador Mary Whelan, then holding the rotating seat of EU president, announced agreement with all the African states on a resolution, it was a disgrace. The final resolution did not condemn the atrocities, nor demand they end, nor require humanitarian access. It even expressed appreciation to the Sudanese government for its cooperation with the UN Commission on Human Rights. The United States could not, in good conscience, support this resolution.⁴⁴ The European Union resolution was adopted by the UN commission even though the member states had the report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights’ Mission to Darfur. The report highlighted various terrible acts that were contributing to a reign of terror including, but not limited to: repeated attacks on civilians by the government of Sudan and its proxy militia forces with a view to their displacement; the use of systematic and indiscriminate aerial bombardments and ground attacks on unarmed civilians; the use of disproportionate force by the government of Sudan and Janjaweed forces; the fact that the Janjaweed operated with total impunity and in close coordination with the forces of the government of Sudan; the fact that the attacks appeared to have been ethnically based and the pattern of attacks on civilians included killing, rape and pillage.⁴⁵

In more than 20 years of multilateral diplomacy, this was one of my greatest disappointments. Well-meaning but misguided diplomats had allowed their understandable desire for consensus decision-making or, absent that, the broadest possible support to blind them to the principles of decency and humanity they believed in and they turn their backs on the victims in Darfur. The diplomatic minuet had resulted in a watered-down, weak resolution. The message seemed clear: the international community cared little about the tens of thousands already killed and the hundreds of thousands driven from their homes and living in desperate conditions. Khartoum acted accordingly. The ethnic slaughter continued.

There followed a series of diplomatic milestones, but the relentless violence continued. In April, Khartoum and the two rebel groups agreed to a 95-day ceasefire, but violence continued.⁴⁶ On May 28, 2004, Khartoum and the rebels agreed to African ceasefire monitors, but violence continued. On June 3, the UN gathered donors seeking \$236 million in aid for Darfur. Days later, the UN said that Khartoum was still blocking humanitarian aid. Diplomacy continued in a parallel universe having little to no impact on the ground.⁴⁷ The relentless brutality continued.

In June, the leaders at the Group of 8 Summit joined in calling on the Sudanese government to disarm the militias that “are responsible for massive human rights violations in Darfur.”⁴⁸ The UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for an end to fighting in Darfur and urging the creation of a peacekeeping force in southern Sudan.⁴⁹

In July 2004, former Senator John Danforth became US Ambassador to the United Nations. For more than three years, he had served as President Bush’s Special Envoy working to broker a peace agreement in Sudan between the north and south. He brought a keen interest in Sudan and added urgency to the efforts to help end not only the north-south civil war but also the killings in Darfur.

Ambassador Danforth immediately began working on a strong UN Security Council resolution that would call for an end to the carnage in Darfur and threaten sanctions. He was met by strong resistance. China has precious oil concessions in Sudan.⁵⁰ Russia has large military contracts with Khartoum. And Pakistan sought to provide support for Sudan’s Muslim government. With Beijing and Moscow, two veto wielding states, plus Islamabad, and the elected African members of the Security Council all opposed to the strong US language, there was no realistic possibility for the sort of robust resolution Danforth sought.

After weeks of wavering, council members finally passed a resolution condemning the killings in Darfur but stopped short of creating sanctions against the Sudanese government for its involvement in the atrocities.⁵¹

In the months that followed, the Security Council remained “seized” by the issue. Reports on events in Darfur were delivered and Security Council meetings were held. With each new deliberation, the language got tougher, but the violence continued. On October 15, 2004, the UN World Health Organization estimated that 70,000 already had died in Darfur. And on October 30, Rwandan troops arrived to join Nigerian soldiers in Darfur to monitor another shaky ceasefire. The African Union’s decision to deploy monitors to Sudan was a significant step.⁵² It was the first commitment to actually do something beyond rhetoric to try to stop the killing. However, the number of AU monitors were few, the landmass to watch very large, and the “terms of reference” strictly limited them to monitoring rather than allowing them to stop the violence. The killing continued.

In September, President Bush went to the UN General Assembly and called the vicious violence in Darfur “genocide.” He called on the UN to act.⁵³ In November 2004, it was the United States’ turn to assume the rotating seat as President of the UN Security Council. Danforth sought to take the Security Council on the road to dramatize the international community’s concern about Sudan’s civil war and the killings in Darfur. For the first time in more than 30 years, the council

met outside its headquarters in New York City for a special session in Nairobi, Kenya. This increased world attention on the situation and heightened pressure for action. In the run-up to the Security Council's trip to Africa, Khartoum felt the mounting pressure and, for the first time, agreed to create "no-fly zones" over Darfur, banning military flights over the region. And on November 27, Khartoum announced it was lifting all restrictions on aid workers and revoked a state of emergency in North Darfur. On December 19, Khartoum agreed to stop military operations in Darfur. But still, the killing continued.

Victims of the violence have not been limited to Africans from Darfur. International aid workers also have been harmed. After the killing of four staffers, on December 21, 2004, the British aid charity Save the Children pulled all 350 of its staff out of Darfur. On March 16, 2005, the UN was forced to withdraw its entire international staff from areas of Darfur after the Janjaweed said the Arab militias would target foreigners and UN convoys.⁵⁴

By March 2005, estimates of those who had died in this senseless conflict had risen to more than 200,000 and nearly two million people had been driven from their homes and were living in desperate conditions. Physicians for Human Rights issued a report that detailed destruction of community support, economic structures, livestock, food production, wells and farming capacity as well as huts and homes burned to empty shells.⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch released a video interview with Musa Hilal, who admitted to committing crimes in Darfur. He said that the Sudan government steered the attacks. "These people get their orders from Khartoum," he stated.⁵⁶

A document seized from a Janjaweed official that the AU believed to be authentic calls for the "execution of all directives from the president of the republic." It went on to call for the Janjaweed to "change the demography of Darfur and make it void of (black) African tribes." It encouraged "killing, burning villages and farms, terrorizing people, confiscating property from members of African tribes and forcing them from Darfur."

In the face of continuing ethnic violence and mounting evidence of Khartoum's central role in the ongoing carnage, on March 31, the UN Security Council voted to refer war crime suspects in Darfur to the International Criminal Court.⁵⁷ The ICC launched its formal investigation that June.

By May 2005, there were tentative signs of progress. Attacks diminished, but most observers believe the reduced violence was not due to any change of heart but because by then the government forces and the Janjaweed had successfully killed, displaced and intimidated the black Africans in Darfur.

However, in July 2005, UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Louise Arbor reported that "rape and gang rape continue to be perpetrated by armed elements in Darfur, some of whom are members of law enforcement agencies and the armed forces."⁵⁸ Also in July, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Khartoum for talks with government leaders about the appalling situation in Darfur. When she sat down with Sudanese President El-Bashir to press the case, Sudanese security forces manhandled US officials and reporters traveling with her.⁵⁹ Scuffling with US government officials and the media traveling with the Secretary of State is unacceptable on many levels. But more fundamentally, it demonstrated Khartoum's continued sense of impunity.

By mid-summer, there were 3,000 AU peacekeepers on the ground in Darfur with thousands more committed. Armored vehicles, training and maintenance assistance, and personal protective equipment had begun to arrive to support the AU Mission in Sudan. For a time, the worst violence abated.

On September 15, a series of AU mediated talks began in Abuja, Nigeria between Khartoum and the rebel groups. The lack of unity among factions within the rebel groups made progress difficult; there often was a spike in violence before each round of discussions as one group or another sought to enhance its leverage.

During the fall, despite a formal ceasefire of a year's duration between the rebel groups and Khartoum, security in Darfur deteriorated. Much of the violence was directed against internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees around the refugee camps, but not only them. In addition, there was a wave of violence targeting aid workers.⁶⁰ Some of it was "banditing committed by those who have nothing left to live off in a desert region razed by nearly three years of fighting. As a local tribal leader (told *The Economist*) 'There is nothing left to loot apart from the NGO convoys.'"⁶¹ There are many reports of armed gunman ambushing humanitarian aid convoys, beating aid workers, sexually abusing women and looting supplies.

But even more disturbing are the claims of AU observers that despite the formal ceasefire, Khartoum's attack helicopters continued to swoop down strafing villages in coordinated attacks with the Janjaweed.⁶² In October, the AU condemned "the government's act of calculated and wanton destruction that had killed at least 44 people and displaced thousands over two weeks time."⁶³

Relentlessly, the violence continued. In early December, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) reported that in Western Darfur, the Janjaweed attacked Congo Harasa and destroyed the town's wells that humanitarian workers had constructed.⁶⁴ UN staff and international NGO workers continued to face "harassment, threats and ambushes" in Darfur.⁶⁵ Later that month, UNICEF, the UN Children's Fund, reported that 1.25 million children in need were beyond reach of aid in Darfur due to continuing violence. UNICEF Country Representative Ted Chaiban said, "Persistent instability and political stalemate means that children have little hope for a meaningful future."⁶⁶

In late December, UNMIS reported that both Sudanese government and rebel troops were violating the ceasefire agreement. Banditry and looting continued. Janjaweed activities had increased with fresh attacks on villages and "harassment, beating, (rape) and killing of internally displaced people grazing their cattle outside their camps."⁶⁷ The cycle of violence again was escalating. Fighting in the Zalenjei area of west Darfur resulted in 3,800 new arrivals at IDP camps with another 5,000 displaced, reportedly stranded in the conflict area.⁶⁸ At the end of 2005, Secretary-General Annan confirmed that there had been a marked deterioration in Darfur since September "including an increase in ethnic clashes."⁶⁹

Furthermore, the atrocities in Darfur had bled into neighboring Chad. Janjaweed crossed Sudan's border to terrorize displaced blacks from Darfur, marauding near refugee camps, attacking those who traveled out to gather wood, killing men and raping women.⁷⁰

In late January 2006, reacting to growing bloodshed in Darfur, Annan sought to increase diplomatic pressure. He called on all involved parties “to immediately stop all hostility, to respect international humanitarian law and resolve their differences at the negotiating table.”⁷¹ On the same day, UNCHR issued a detailed report portraying dismal human rights conditions in Darfur. The report stated that government forces working with Janjaweed continued to attack camps and villages occupied by IDPs; killing and wounding civilians and destroying homes. The High Commissioner’s Office called on Khartoum to end the prevailing culture of impunity.⁷²

In February 2006, the US again took the UN Security Council’s rotating presidency. At the first council meeting of the month, the US initiated work on Sudan.⁷³ And the next day, the Security Council unanimously agreed to begin the planning process to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur, with a final decision to come later.⁷⁴ That planning has begun. However, difficulties are expected in locating countries willing to contribute troops to the UN mission.

Meanwhile, the government initiated demonstrations in Khartoum opposing deployment of any UN peacekeeping force in Darfur and sought an extension of the ineffectual AU presence.⁷⁵ The AU did agree to extend its force in Darfur for an additional six months and, despite objections from Khartoum, agreed “in principle” to ask the UN to take over in Darfur.⁷⁶

Compounds in Darfur have nonetheless continued to be attacked and clashes between armed groups are ongoing.⁷⁷ There has been an increase in Khartoum’s obstruction of humanitarian aid as well.⁷⁸ In late March, Jan Pronk, the UN special envoy to Sudan, warned of an upsurge of violence in Darfur.⁷⁹ In southern Darfur, “militia continue to cleanse village after village,” he said. “The government has not disarmed them.” Pronk called on the international community to act to augment and assist the 7,000 AU troops that are under funded and poorly equipped. He called for a robust international force.

And in early April 2006, Manual Aranda da Silva, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Sudan, reported that about 150,000 people had been driven from their homes in Darfur in February and March and dozens of villages had been burnt to the ground.⁸⁰

The Norwegian Refugee Council, an NGO operating the Kalma refugee camp in Nyala—one of the largest in the region, was ordered to leave Darfur by the Sudanese government.⁸¹ And Khartoum briefly blocked Jan Egeland from visiting Darfur, prompting him to say, “My interpretation is that they don’t want me to see what I was planning to witness in South and West Darfur, which is renewed attacks on the civilian population.”⁸²

UN Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi of the UN Peacekeeping office told the Security Council that “April seems set to be another month of spiraling violence.”⁸³

What lies ahead? At the conclusion of his book, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, Prunier notes, “The Darfur horror is still unfolding... Indignation will be voiced and diplomatic maneuvering will take place while the GoS (Government of Sudan) will continue to procrastinate, lie and obfuscate in its usual fashion. Whatever something practical will be attempted at the international panel level remains to be seen.”⁸⁴

With violence still raging in Darfur, indeed an upswing of violence, what should the international community do? What is the responsibility to protect?⁸⁵

Going Forward

Every genocide is unique. Each has singular contributing factors and horrors that are particular. But every ethnic cleansing and each act of genocide is evil. In the face of such evil and as witness to such great suffering, to fail to act is morally inexcusable.

Michael Barnett was a political officer at the US Mission to the United Nations at the time of the genocide in Rwanda. He has written a disturbing book that documents the actions and inactions of the UN and its member states during the 100 days of mass slaughter in Rwanda. In *Eyewitness to Genocide*, he writes, “[T]he UN preferred talk to action.... My images of the Rwanda genocide are now situated alongside those of a UN so consumed by fears of its own mortality that it had little evident compassion for those on the ground. When I now think of Rwanda... I think of diplomats and UN officials hurriedly milling in and out of Security Council meetings. They are reciting their talking points and proclaiming, in the UN’s locution, that they ‘remain actively seized of the matter.’ And they deliver only rhetoric in the hope that rhetoric represents its own consolation.”⁸⁶ As Barnett points out, rhetoric is not sufficient. Action is required. We ought not to turn our backs on the moral challenge of Darfur.

The United States cannot be the “world’s policeman” for every clash and conflict anywhere in the world, nor should it be. There are limits to blood, treasury and reach. The US must be attentive to national interests: security, economic and otherwise. But, at the same time, the US cannot turn its back on the principles we hold nor the values we cherish. We cannot deny our humanity. American exceptionalism is grounded in our morality and driven by a faith in the transcendent value of the great ideas on which our nation was founded: faith, the rule of law, freedom, opportunity and the equal rights of all mankind. Surely ethnic cleansing and genocide so offend our ideals and trample our values that it must stir us to action.

The stain of blood from this killing frenzy in Darfur rests not only on the hands of those in attack helicopters swooping down on defenseless villages and those who ride on camel and horseback to burn dwellings, kill livestock, slay black males and rape women. The taint also rests on those who fail to stop the killing. It scars our time, disfigures the conscience of decency and debases any claim to righteousness.

That we cannot do everything does not mean we should do nothing.

In 2005, NATO began a fledgling training mission to help better prepare the AU peacekeepers in Sudan. Lately, it has provided some airlifts. On February 12, President Bush met with Secretary-General Annan in the Oval Office, after which, Annan said, “I’m very happy that we have agreed to work together on the Darfur issue, working with other governments from Europe, from Asia and other regions to ensure that we do have an effective security presence on the ground.”⁸⁷ And on March 20, 2006, President Bush met with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Schaffer to discuss a possible expansion of NATO’s role in Sudan.⁸⁸ After the meeting, Bush said he would like to see more NATO involvement to “make it clear to the Sudanese government that we’re

intent upon providing security for the people there, and intent upon helping work toward a lasting peace.”⁸⁹

It is important that the US commit diplomatic and other resources to insure progress at the Darfur peace talks in Abuja. Just as Bush sent John Danforth to help broker a peace between northern and southern Sudan, the President should also designate a special envoy to the peace talks in Abuja.⁹⁰

The US also should remain actively engaged on the Darfur issue at the UN Security Council with other member states and the Secretariat working for a comprehensive plan for UN peacekeepers, sufficient resources to get the job done and early deployment. The US should continue to push for Security Council targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for the worst abuses including seizing assets, targeted travel bans and an arms embargo. If we cannot get muscular sanctions through the Security Council, the US should pursue US-European sanctions. The US, in addition to its own contributions, should actively solicit others to step forward to guarantee success.⁹¹

Acting with our allies, the US should push for greater NATO involvement to help stop the killing in Darfur. It is especially important that the government push France and Germany to support NATO enforcement of a no-fly zone over Darfur. Bush is on the right track. However, the US must lean forward and redouble our efforts to insure that NATO and the UN accomplish the mission our values require us to accept.

Sixty years ago, the United States joined with others in saying, “Never again.” Is it not time to give meaning to that pledge? Do we not owe that to the innocent, defenseless people of Darfur? Do we not owe that to ourselves?

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The United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) is a center for innovative programs and dialogue to engage Americans in issues of global concern, from peace and security to genocide prevention and international law. Its policy and advocacy programs support the work of the United Nations, the importance of nations working together and the need for United States leadership in the United Nations. A not-for-profit organization, UNA-USA is a member of the World Federation of United Nations Associations.

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1. See generally, Peter Ronayne, *Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust* (New York, N.Y.; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; 2001); and Linda Polman, *We Did Nothing* (New York, N.Y.; Penguin Putnam Inc.; 2003).
 2. “Rwanda Genocide Failure Berated,” *BBC News*, April 5, 2004. Rwandan President Paul Kagame said, “We should always bear in mind that genocide, wherever it happens, represents the international community’s failure, which I would in fact characterize as deliberate, a convenient failure. ...How could a million lives of the Rwandan people be regarded as so insignificant?” See also, “Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened,” *BBC News*, April 1, 2004.
 3. Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair* (New York; Public Affairs; 2005).
 4. See, Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A Short History to a Long War* (London; Zed Books; 2006). See also, Douglas Hamilton Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars* (Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press; 2003).
 5. Meredith, *ibid.*, p. 144-5.
 6. Meredith, *ibid.*, p. 145.
 7. The Sudanese government and the SPLM peace agreement, called the Machakos Protocol, were finalized in 2004. It gives the south the right to self-determination. After a six-year interim period beginning in January 2005 southerners will choose in a referendum whether to remain in a united Sudan or set up an independent state. Sharia was confirmed as the source of law in the northern two thirds of the country, outside Khartoum, while the south is free to be run as a secular part of Sudan.
 8. The commerce of the ancient Darfur sultanate had been trade in elephant tusks, ostrich feathers and slaves. In the twentieth century this commerce had become unacceptable and there was little else for the people to draw upon in this largely desolate region of Sudan.
 9. Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press; 2005).
 10. See generally Alex de Waal, *Famine That Kills* (Oxford, U.K.; Oxford University Press; 1989).
 11. Prunier, *ibid.*
 12. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *ibid.*...
 13. The two rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).
 14. Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press; 2004), p. 235. See also, Eric D. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press; 2003).
 15. Khartoum had similarly enlisted militia supported by the Sudan military to attack incipient rebellion in Bahr el Ghazal in 1986-88, in the Nuba Mountains in 1992-95 and in the Upper Nile in 1998-2003.
 16. Mark Doyle, “Darfur Misery Has Complex Roots,” *BBC News*, September 9, 2004.
 17. The close coordination between the Sudanese Government in Khartoum and the Janjaweed militia is well documented. See generally, Koert Lindijer, “Analysis: Reining in the Militia,” *BBC News*, October 25, 2004.

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18. See, UN Interagency Report, April 25, 2004, as cited in Wikipedia, "Darfur Conflict". Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darfur_conflict.
19. Human Rights Watch, "Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan," May 7, 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/Sudan0504/>. See also, The World Medical Association, "Genocide Unfolding in Sudan," August, 2004. Available at <http://www.wma.net/e/humanrights/phr.htm>.
20. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Remarks at the day of Remembrance of the 10th Anniversary of the Genocide in Rwanda, Geneva, Switzerland, April 7, 2004. See also, Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, "US Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide: Khartoum and Arab Militias Are Responsible, Powell Says," *Washington Post*, September 10, 2004.
21. Paul Rusesabagina, "Darfur," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 5, 2006.
22. "I'm sitting in the dark on the edge of a camp for displaced people in Darfur. ... You can see it coming in the afternoons. The sky begins to darken and the horizon goes an ominous brown shade of yellow. Then the wind starts and the dust of the Sahara desert whips up, blasting whirling sands in all directions. The people start to run in their long rags, hands bowed against the wind. Then, the heavens simply open, the wind ferociously hurls drenching curtains of water at everything around. Mothers with their children, whose faces are twisted up in misery, squat grasping the sides of their makeshift shelters – which do almost nothing to keep them dry. The torn plastic bags that make up the walls of their twig shelters slap madly in the wind. The ground turns into a mire of mud. ... This is what it is like most nights for them. In the morning we wake up to hear the children crying. In the makeshift hospital here, set up by foreign aid workers, it is so crowded with the sick that some are sleeping on the floors. Among the stench and flies, the children lie wasted, starting into space. Tiny human beings, who were born into the madness of man's inhumanity to man, into the madness of a spate of killing that has left many of their fathers, brothers, grandparents and uncles dead. And now they face starvation which is cruel and slow. Most of the children are too far gone to eat. Some have the peeling skin and lesions that come with advanced starvation – their skin is wrinkled, loose around their bones. The mothers sit by powerless. ..." Hilary Andersson, "Sudan's Cruel and Slow Starvation," *BBC News*, July 24, 2004. See also, "Darfur Aid Worker's Diary XXI", *BBC News*, September 27, 2004.
23. See, for example, "Eyewitness: Terror in Darfur," *BBC News*, November 10, 2004.
24. The following columns by Nicholas Kristof on Darfur have appeared in *The New York Times*: "The Silence of Bystanders," March 19, 2006; "Africa's Brutal Lebenstraum," March 14, 2006; "A Village Waiting for Rape and Murder," March 12, 2006; "Where Killers Roam, the Poison Spreads," March 7, 2006; "What's to be Done About? Plenty," November 29, 2005; "A Tolerable Genocide," November 27, 2005; "Sudan's Department of Gang Rape," November 22, 2005; "Never Again, Again?" November 20, 2005; "A Wimp On Genocide," September 18, 2005; "Bush, A Friend of Africa," July 5, 2005; "Uncover Your Eyes," June 7, 2005; "A Policy of Rape," June 5, 2005; "Day 141 of Bush's Silence," May 31, 2005; "Mr. Bush, Take a Look At MTV," April 17, 2005; "The Pope and Hypocrisy," April 5, 2005; "The American Witness," March 2, 2005; "The Secret Genocide Archive," February 23, 2005; "He Ain't Heavy," October 20, 2004; "The Dead Walk," October 16, 2004; "As Humans Are Hunted," October 13, 2004; "Reign of Terror," September 11, 2004; "Saying No To Killers," July 21, 2004; "Dithering As Others Die," June 25, 2004; "Magboula's Brush With Genocide," June 23, 2004; "Sudan's Final Solution," June 19, 2004; "Dare We Call It Genocide," June 16, 2004; "Bush Points the Way," May 29, 2004; "Cruel Choices," April 14, 2004; "Starved For Safety," March 31, 2004; "Will We Say 'Never Again' Yet Again?" March 27, 2004; and "Ethnic Cleansing, Again," March 24, 2004. See also, Nicholas D. Kristof, "Genocide in Slow Motion," *The New York Review of Books*, February 9, 2006.
25. Amnesty International, "Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and its Consequences," July 19, 2004. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafsr540762004>.
26. Samantha Power, "Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped," *The New Yorker*, August 30, 2004.

27. Julie Flint, "Sudan: Peace, but at What Price?" Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, June 15, 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/15/darfur8850.htm>.

28. Human Rights Watch interview, Ahmad, Chad, April 6, 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/5.htm>.

29. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

30. Human Rights Watch interview, Darfur, April, 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/5.htm>.

31. See generally, Human Rights Watch, "Sexual Violence and its Consequences among Displaced Persons in Darfur and Chad," April, 2005. Available at <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/darfur0505/>.

Nicholas Kristof has written, "[T]he mass rapes in Darfur have been among the most effective means for the government to terrorize tribal populations, break their will and drive them away. Rape is feared all the more in Darfur for two reasons. Most important, a woman who has been raped is ruined; in some cases, she is evicted by her family and forced to build her own hut and live there on her own. And not only is the woman shamed for life, but so is her entire extended family. The second reason is that the people in the region practice an extreme form of female genital cutting called infibulation, in which a girl's vagina is sewn shut until marriage. Thus when an unmarried girl is raped, the act leads to additional painful physical injuries; and the risk of HIV transmission increases. From the government's point of view, rape is a successful method of control because it sows terror among the victimized population, and yet it initially attracted relatively little attention from foreign observers, because women are too ashamed to complain." Nicholas D. Kristof, "Genocide in Slow Motion," *The New York Review of Books*, February 9, 2006.

32. Human Rights Watch interview, Feisal, Darfur, April 5, 2004. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/5.htm>.

33. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

34. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

35. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

36. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

37. Amnesty International, *ibid*.

38. On April 23, 2003 two hundred and sixty men from the rebel group Sudanese Liberation Army attacked a small airport in El Fasher. Five Antonov airplanes and two helicopter gunships were destroyed and about one hundred Sudanese soldiers were killed. This was the first significant violence committed by the still obscure SLA.

Much of this reconstruction of events was drawn from Reuters Foundation, "Chronology of Darfur's Humanitarian Crisis. Available at <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdest/L10769995.htm>.

39. Samantha Power, "Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped?" *The New Yorker*, August 30, 2004.

40. *Ibid*.

41. See generally, "Rwanda Remembers Genocide Victims," *BBC News*, April 7, 2004; "Rwanda Marks Genocide Anniversary," *BBC News*, April 6, 2004. See also, "UN Chief's Rwanda Genocide Regret," *BBC News*, March 26, 2004.

42. See generally, Romeo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto; Random House Canada; 2003); Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan* (New York; Verso; 2004); Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda* (New York; Picador; 1998); Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York; Basic Books; 2002); and Elizabeth Neaffer, *The Key to My Neighbor's House: Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda* (New York; Reader USA; 2001). And for a volume that offers a ray of hope out of the terrible darkness of Rwanda's genocide, see Immaculee Ilibagizo, *Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust* (Carlsbad, California; Hay House; 2006).

43. Richard S. Williamson, *Human Rights, Democracy and Restorative Justice* (Chicago, Illinois; Prairie Institute; 2004), pp. 125-7.

44. The United States introduced its own robust resolution. But with a softer option now introduced by the European Union, the US resolution failed.

45. Report of the Acting Commissioner for Human Rights on Sudan. E/CN.4/2005/27.

46. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM).

47. "Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters, 25 June 2004," Press Release SG/SM/9388. Available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9388.doc.htm>. See also, "Greatest Humanitarian Crisis Today in Southern Africa, World Food Program Head Tells Security Council," United Nations Press Release SC/8933; June 30, 2005; and "United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Transition from Relief to Development," United Nations Press Release IHA/1071; August 8, 2005.

48. G-8 Statement on Sudan, Sea Island, Georgia, June 10, 2004. Available at <http://www.g7.utorontsummit/2004seaissudan.html>.

49. Security Council Resolution 1547 (2004).

50. "China has invested some \$10 billion in Sudan. The state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. owns 40%, the largest share, in the Greater Nile Petroleum Co. (GNPOC). State-owned China Petroleum Engineering and Construction (CPEC) has built a pipeline from the GNPOC fields to the Red Sea, and a refinery complex outside Khartoum.

"China owns most of an oil field in Darfur and 41 percent of a field in the Melut Basin. Another Chinese firm, Sinopec, is building a tanker terminal. About 70 percent of Sudan's oil exports go to China, and account for 10 percent of China's oil imports. In exchange for oil, Beijing provides weapons and diplomatic support. China has supplied Sudan with tanks, artillery, helicopters and fighter aircraft. China has flooded Darfur with antipersonnel mines. It is estimated as much as 80 percent of Sudan's oil revenue goes to buy arms...

"Beijing has also helped Sudan build its own factories to manufacture small arms and ammunitions, the real weapons of mass destruction in Khartoum's campaign of ethnic cleansing." William Hawkins, "China's Role in Genocide," *Washington Times*, March 27, 2006.

51. Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004). The resolution was passed by a vote of 13-0 with China and Pakistan abstaining. See, Paul Reynolds, "Sudan: Step by Step Pressure," *BBC News*, August 4, 2004. "The United Nations is still reluctant to intervene with force in Darfur and a strategy of pressure on the government of Sudan is being tried first."

52. "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) originated in early July, 2004, when both the African Union and European Union sent monitors to monitor the Darfur crisis ceasefire signed in April 2004. In August 2004, the African Union sent 150 Rwandan troops in to protect the ceasefire monitors. However, it soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they were joined by 150 Nigerian troops." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Union_Mission_in_Sudan.

53. President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, The United Nations, New York, New York, September 23, 2004. There has been controversy on whether or not the atrocities in Darfur have reached a large enough scale to properly be labeled “genocide.” Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer coined the word in 1943. He combined the Greek word “genos” – race – with the Latin word “cide.” See generally, “Analysis: Defining Genocide,” *BBC News*, February 1, 2005.

54. See, “Egeland: New Famine Threat Faces Darfur,” *Aljazeera.com*, February 19, 2005.

55. See “Sudan: Organized Campaign against Non-Arabs in Darfur, Says Rights Group,” *IRIN News.Org* (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), June 24, 2004.

56. “Darfur: Militia Leader Implicates Khartoum,” *Human Rights Watch*, Available at <http://hrw.org/video/2005/musa>. See also, “Video Transcript: Exclusive Video Interview with Alleged Janjaweed Leader,” *Human Rights Watch*, March 2, 2005. Available at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/02/darfur10225.htm>.

57. UNSC Res. 1593 (2005). Due to the United States objections to the International Criminal Court, the US abstained on this resolution. See also Human Rights Watch, “UN Security Council Refers Darfur to the ICC: Historic Step toward Justice; Further Protection Measures Needed,” March 31, 2005. Available at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/31/sudan10408.htm>. At a February 16, 2005 meeting of the UN Security Council, Louise Arbor, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said a referral to the ICC is “the only credible way” to bring the perpetrators of the crimes in Darfur to justice.

For a thoughtful review of ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s work building a case against the perpetrators of crimes in Darfur, see Elizabeth Rubin, “If Not Peace, Then Justice,” *New York Times Magazine*, April 2, 2006. See also, Amnesty International, “Sudan” Who Will Answer for the Crimes?” January 18, 2005. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR540062005?open&of=ENG-SDN>; Human Rights Watch, “Darfur: ICC Prosecutor Briefs Security Council,” June 29, 2005. Available at <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/29/sudan11233htm>; and Human Rights Watch, “Entrenched Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,” December 2005. Available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/>.

58. See also, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan,” May 7, 2004; E/CN.4/2005/3.

59. “US: Sudan Apologize to Rice Over Rough-up. Guards Manhandled Secretary of State’s Delegation, NBC Reporter,” *MSNBC*, July 21, 2005.

60. See generally, “Sudan: Darfur’s Despair,” *The Economist*, October 15, 2005, pp. 47-9. See also, UN News Center, “Annan Condemns ‘Vicious Attack,’ that Killed 20 in Darfur Village,” December 20, 2005.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.* After a government-supported Arab militia attacked the Aro Sharow refugee village on September 28, killing at least 32, the AU accused both Khartoum and rebels of violating the ceasefire agreement. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4300526.htm>.

63. Associated Press, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051002/ap_re_mi_ea/sudan.darfur.com. In December, an attack on the town of Adre, Chad, near the Sudan border led to the death of 300 rebels. Khartoum was blamed for the attack. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4544352.stm>.

64. UN News Center, “UN Mission in Sudan Reports Continued Insecurity in troubled Darfur Region,” December 7, 2005.

65. *Ibid.*

66. UN News Center, "1.25 Million Children beyond Reach of Aid in Sudan's Darfur Region, UN Warns," December 20, 2005.

"John Hefferman, the lead researcher and author of the report, 'Darfur: Assault on Survival – A Call for Security, Justice and Restitution,' said Khartoum and its militia, the Janjaweed, 'have in a systematic way attacked the very survival of a people by destroying property, livestock, communities and families.' Refugees interviewed by the researchers spoke of early morning attacks by armed men on horseback or in pick-up trucks, backed up by Sudanese military aircraft. The attackers killed and raped villagers, then looted and burned houses and shops, poisoned wells, stole livestock and torched prime farmland. One such testimony was given by a 33-year-old mother from Furawiya Village, who said she traveled for five days, through which she lived off berries and a little food supplied by the international organizations. "Sometimes, I would have to wait in line all day just for one bucket of water. After two months, my donkey died from not having enough food. And then my youngest child, a three-year-old girl got sick. There were no medicines to help her. She died." Stephen Mbogo, "Human Rights Group Call for More Action on Darfur," *CNS.News.com*, January 13, 2006.

67. UN News Center, "Western Sudan's Darfur Area is still Scene of Rape and Banditry, UN Mission Says," December 27, 2005. "Eleven vehicles of the rebel Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) reportedly attacked South Darfur's Marla last week Monday and Tuesday, leaving five people dead and four wounded in what was perceived by some to be retaliation for Sudanese Government attacks on Bajo on 13 December and on Duwana on 18 December, UNMIS said."

68. UN News Center, "Strife Drives More Sudanese in Darfur from their Homes," UN Reports," December 28, 2005.

69. UN News Center, "Despite Forceful Security Council Moves, Atrocities Continue in Sudan's Darfur Region – UN Report," December 29, 2005.

70. See Nicholas Kristof, "Africa's Brutal Lebenstraum," *New York Times*, March 14, 2006; and Nicholas Kristof, "A Village Waiting for Rape and Murder," *New York Times*, March 12, 2006. See also, Editorial, "Spreading Genocide to Chad," *New York Times*, March 30, 2006.

71. UN News Center, "Sudan: Concerned at Rising Violence in Darfur, Annan Calls on Parties to Halt Attacks," January 27, 2006. "The Secretary-General is seriously concerned by the major escalation of violence in the Jebel Marra region of Darfur, particularly the heavy fighting in the Golo and Shearia areas that have forced humanitarian agencies to evacuate," a spokesman for Mr. Annan said in a statement issued in New York."

72. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.5.

73. See, United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release #14(06), February 2, 2006.

74. UNSC Presidential Statement, "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," S/PRST/2006/5 of 3, February 2006... The resolution called for a 12,000 to 20,000 troop presence in Darfur with the 7,000 AU troops already there being given new weapons and being incorporated into the UN mission. The UN peacekeepers would have a greater mandate to protect civilians.

75. Warren Hoge, "Envoy Says Sudan Doesn't Want UN Force in Darfur," *New York Times*, February 28, 2006. See also, "UN Peacekeeping Plan Stirs Protest," *Chicago Tribune*, March 10, 2003 and Stephen Mbogo, "As Darfur Aid Efforts Struggle, Sudan Rejects 'Foreign Intervention.'" *CBSNEWS.COM*, March 22, 2006.

76. "Africa Extends Darfur Peace Force," *BBC News*, March 10, 2006. "Sudan had threatened to leave the AU if it asked the UN to take over. ... (However) the government realizes that it would be very difficult to reject a UN offer, if it followed a formal request from the AU." See also, Associated Press, "African Troops Extend Darfur

Mission, March 11, 2006; Jonah Fisher, "Darfur's Doomed Peacekeeping Mission," *BBC News*, March 9, 2006. See also, Jonah Fisher, "Darfur's Doomed Peacekeeping Mission," *BBC News*, March 9, 2006; "Sudan Rebukes UN Plan for Quick Darfur Takeover," *Reuters*, March 25, 2006; and "Sudan Rejects UN Darfur Force," *Aljazeera*, March 25, 2006.

77. See, for example, World Food Program, "Violence along Chad/Sudan Border Threatens Thousands," Press Release, March 24, 2006.

78. "Sudan: UN Humanitarian Envoy Criticizes Obstruction by Government," *Reuters*, April 5, 2006; and Eric Reeves, "Khartoum Sharply Accelerates Its War on Humanitarian Aid in Darfur," *Sudan Tribune*, April 7, 2006.

79. Warren Hoge, "Darfur Attacks Overwhelm Peace Force, UN Reports," *New York Times*, March 22, 2006.

80. "UN Concerned Over Security Situation in Darfur," *China View*, April 7, 2006. Available at www.chinaview.cn.

81. Joe De Capua, "Sudan Orders Norwegian NGO to Leave Darfur," *Voice of America News*, April 4, 2006.

82. Marc Lacey, "Sudan Blocks UN Official From Visiting Darfur Region," *New York Times*, April 4, 2006.

83. Bradley Graham and Colum Lynch, "NATO Role in Darfur on Table," *Washington Post*, April 10, 2006.

84. Gerard Prunier, *ibid.*, p. 159.

85. Generally, see Gareth J. Evans, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, January 2002. See also, Ramesh Takur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (Cambridge, U.K.; Cambridge University Press; 2006); Ted Lundberg, "Protect the People," *Washington Times*, September 27, 2005; and United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, September 20, 2005 (Doc. A/60/L.1).

86. Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, New York; Cornell University Press; 2002), pp. x-xiii.

87. UN News Center, "Annan and President Bush Agree to Work Together in Darfur," February 13, 2006. See also, "Darfur Peacekeeping Force Tops Bush-Annan Talks," *Associated Press*, February 13, 2006.

88. Paula Wolfson, "Bush, NATO Leader Discuss Darfur," *Voice of America*, March 20, 2006.

89. NATO Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer said if the AU asks for UN assistance, "the NATO allies will be ready to do more in enabling a United Nations force in Darfur." See also, Bradley Graham and Colum Lynch, *ibid.*

90. In April, 2006, the Abuja negotiations were not moving forward. See generally, "Darfur Peace Efforts Failing," *The Scotsman*, April 10, 2006; and "Nigeria-Sudan: AU Mediators Fail to Move Darfur Talks Forward," *IRIN*, April 10, 2006. See also, Edith M. Lederer, "Council Wants Deal on Darfur Conflict," *Associated Press*, April 11, 2006.

91. The United States has contributed over \$750 million in aid for Darfur for food, shelter, access to clean water, and basic health services. USAID "Darfur Humanitarian Emergency." Available at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub_saharan_africa/sudan/darfur.html. The United States government has been the largest contributor to Darfur relief by far.

92. The opinions described in this report do not necessarily reflect those of UNA-USA.